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Introduction  
One of the most important set of experiments with the scaling up of natural resource 
management institutions in Africa has involved fisheries co-management programmes. 
Fisheries co-management is an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is 
shared between the government and user groups. This arrangement can run from the 
government making decisions based on a minimal exchange of information with fishers to 
government delegating authority and the fishers keeping them informed about progress (Sen 
and Raakjær-Nielsen 1996). This approach has been used extensively in Africa, most often 
tending toward the minimal exchange pole, as part of the overall trend toward community-
based natural resource management. The idea is that co-management will release fishers’ 
knowledge and cooperation toward the sustaining of fish stocks. These things are sometimes 
achieved. Especially when mobilized on larger scales, however, co-management programmes 
depend for their success on how they are embedded in the realities of economic competition 
and political power at both local and regional levels. 
Fisheries are a shared, migratory resource and small-scale approaches often have limited 
impact on resource conservation. Because of this, some co-management programmes have 
attempted to address conservation on large water bodies. In this paper we examine one such 
programme in each of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. These have all taken the form of 
replicating around the water body village management committees (VMCs) that are nested 
within district level committees. These programmes were initiated by government fisheries 
agencies working with NGOs or donors. The ones examined here also utilized traditional 
authorities in variable and sometimes important roles. Examining the implications of the 
different combinations of institutions that are involved in these programmes can yield insight 
into how power and politics influence outcomes when the trying to carry out community 
based resource management across large scales.  
The research reported on here is one product of the ten-year (1993-2003) Worldwide 
Collaborative Research Project on Fisheries Co-management (WCRPFC). The WCRPFC did 
empirical research on fisheries co-management in both Asia and Africa. During the first five 
years, Phase I of the project focused on descriptive case studies co-management experiences. 
It produced a large number of research products, culminating in an edited volume reviewing 
global experiences with co-management (Wilson et al., 2003) and a policy brief (Raakjær-
Nielsen et al., 2004). In Africa Phase II was characterized by a coordinated attempt to test a 
particular set of hypotheses generated by the qualitative research in Phase I. This paper 
reports the qualitative analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews done with participants 
of large scale co-management programmes on the Mweru-Luapula system in Zambia, Lake 
Malombe in Malawi, and the Atlantic Ocean in Mozambique.  
The paper begins with a review of fisheries co-management. This section draws mainly on the 
descriptive studies done in Phase I of the WCRPFC, many of which are available as grey 
literature. It also draws on published work of other scholars. Then we turn to a report of the 
Phase II activities. These activities were launched by a workshop held in 2000 which 
formulated a set of general hypotheses to be examined in the three countries. The second half 
of the paper reports on the methods used to examine these hypotheses and the main results.  
Background on Fisheries Co-management in Africa  
Most co-management arrangements on the African continent have been introduced and driven 
by governments, often as a result of NGO or donor initiatives, and remain largely top-down 
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(Hara and Raakjær Nielsen, 2003). The motivation from the government's perspective has 
been access to information at the local level (Wilson, 2003a), particularly to aid enforcement 
(Haraldsdottir, 2000). In Western and Southern Africa the national-level legal frameworks 
began in the late 1990s to shift toward supporting co-management. Legislation in those years 
moved forward in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin 
(Raakjær-Nielsen and Sverdrup-Jensen, 1999.  In general the organization of government 
fisheries management and research services has not reflected any move towards co-
management (Donda, 2001; Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen, 2003).  
Only limited empowerment of the local fishing population can be observed in existing co-
management efforts (Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen, 2003). It is too simple to argue that the top-
down implementation of co-management in Africa is attributed to a lack of political will, the 
situation is more complex. In fact, local co-management groups themselves often place great 
emphasis on their role as enforcers of government rules. Debates between local committees 
and government officers about the level of appropriate policing authority are common. 
Community-based organizations doing enforcement work related to issues including and 
beyond resource management is hardly an alien model in Africa. On Lake Victoria, for 
example, beach leaders, political parties and local voluntary crime fighters, all of whom make 
some rules but who are mainly enforcement groups for wider institutions, are a much more 
common model of local organization than autonomous resource management groups (Wilson, 
2002).  
One of the most commonly heard criticisms of the community based natural resource 
management has been the treatment of rural communities as homogeneous (Wilson, 2003b). 
Within fishing communities’ particular fishing rights or techniques are rarely the basis of a 
local identity (Magrath, 1989). Fishery conflicts usually express other kinds of divisions such 
as ethnicity (Malasha, 2002), gender (Medard and Wilson, 1996), colonial domination 
(Malasha, 2002) and class (Malasha, 2002). This last category includes the very common 
conflicts between large scale and small scale fishing boats and operations (Platteau, 1989; 
Poiosse, 2002; Sene, 1985). Questions of security and net theft are also significant problems 
and can be the main rationale for local organizing (Wilson, 2002). 
Perhaps the most common basis of fisheries conflicts in rural Africa is seasonal and longer 
term migration (Atti-Mama, 1999; Donda, 2001; Konan, 1999; Nieland et al., 1996). 
Migration can catalyse or exacerbate conflicts based on other categories (Jul-Larsen and 
Malasha, 1999; Malasha, 2002) or on resource depletion (Donda and Njaya, 2002; Konan, 
1999). It is important to note that while conflicts may be based on these many different 
conflicting needs and identities, they are most commonly expressed as conflicts about 
“traditional” fishing rights and very often “destructive” fishing techniques rather than as 
direct criticism of the other group. Recent research by Jul-Larsen et al. (2002) on African 
inland waters led them to argue that where freshwater system water levels fluctuate, as is very 
common in Africa, an increase in numbers of users may actually do little or no long-term 
damage to the resource, in contrast with the much more dangerous introduction of new 
technology or access to large scale markets. Hence, aquatic resources acting as a fall back for 
poor people suffering, e.g. a failed agricultural season, is not in conflict with resource 
conservation. These findings raise important questions for fisheries co-management which too 
often seems most effective when motivated by a desire to exclude outsiders from the resource.  
Wilson (2003a) argues that community motivations for participation in co-management 
usually stem from one of two things: a) a desire for the resources that co-management 
programmes, particularly those involving donors and NGOS often provide; and b) conflicts 
that the community needs help resolving because of declining resources, new fishers coming 
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into new areas, the introduction of more intensive techniques, or conflicts over space for 
gears. In these common cases, conflict provides the motivation for community participation 
and can mean more active and authentic interest in the programmes. This is a well known 
partial explanation used, for example, to explain the success of certain co-management 
programmes in Malawi (Donda, 2001; Hara et al., 2002) and Mozambique (Poiosse, 2002). 
Other scholars have suggested that conflicts undermine co-management. Community 
homogeneity is, in fact, classically supposed to contribute to the success of local management 
(Ostrom, 1990). Internal divisions have made decision-making difficult, been reflected in 
perverse incentives behind compliance with management measures (Nyikahadzoi, 2002), and 
made it difficult to initiate co-management (Medard et al., 2002). 
Closely related to the conflict problem is the appropriate relationship between fisheries co-
management institutions and local elites. These elites cannot be avoided and they are often the 
ones that make co-management legitimate and even possible in communities.  
The term “traditional authorities” (TA) covers many different local institutions, but they are 
mainly chiefs or kings holding offices based in ethnic groups. Village headmen often, but not 
always, report to TAs. Involvement of TAs in resource management in colonial times was 
integrated in or even created by the British under “indirect rule”. On independence natural 
resource management of fisheries was usually formally shifted to the central governments 
(Hviding and Jul-Larsen, 1995), but there are many examples of resistance to this and the TAs 
have had a considerable resurgence in recent years in local fisheries management in both 
Southern (Kapasa, 2004; Lopes and Gervasio, 1999) and Western (Atti-Mama, 1999) Africa. 
In Mozambique despite efforts from politicians, the traditional institutions are "de facto" the 
most respected authorities in the community, much more so than the formal government 
authorities (Lopes and Gervasio, 1999). In Zambia the experience has been that fisheries co-
management programmes that involve TAs continue to function when NGO support has been 
withdrawn, while those that ignore the TAs do not. A different outcome, however, was 
experienced in Malawi where a co-management programme that involved TAs directly in the 
management committee was less successful as one only composed by elected fishers (Hara et 
al., 2002).  
The role of TAs in fisheries co-management is often problematic. Their authority is 
commonly contested, and the relationship between the TAs and the central governments is 
often strained. They may not have an interest in preserving fish stocks (Allison et al. 2001). 
Some TAs are weak and ineffective, and observers have argued that even strong ones make 
their best contribution when part of a wider governance framework (Scudder and Connelly, 
1985). TAs often grant access to the fishery to both local people and migrants from outside. 
Granting such access is a source of revenue in the form of both cash and fish levies that 
remain in their personal control (Jul-Larsen and Malasha, 1999; Hara et al., 2002; Lopes and 
Gervasio, 1999; Nieland et al., 1996). Co-management arrangements have challenged these 
privileges. The degree to which TAs are accountable to the people they represent is highly 
variable, but often low. Weak accountability has led to a number of documented abuses 
within decentralized natural resource management programmes (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Ribot, 1998; Ribot, 2002).  
Tensions with local elites are not restricted to the TAs. In Zambia, local governments have 
powers to place levies on fish that are the focus of complaints similar to those around the TAs 
about transparency in the use of funds (Kapasa, 2004). Haraldsdottir (2000) argues that the 
village fishing committees in Malawi are often made up of wealthy boat owners and that 
women especially are excluded. Lopes and Gervasio (1999) make a similar critique of co-
management in Mozambique. In their comparison of the more successful Lake Chiuta co-
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management programme with the less successful Lake Malombe programme, Hara et al. 
(2002) and Donda (2001) point to the fact that on Lake Malombe crew members turnover is 
high, gear and boat owners do not go fishing and the catch share system leaves the crew with 
no conservation incentive. On Lake Chiuta the gear owners also fish, which has resulted in 
stronger peer monitoring. Lake Malombe has a high percentage of non-fishers on the co-
management committees while this is not the case on Lake Chiuta. 
In finding ways to address these tensions around the local elites, several scholars have 
focussed on the make-up of the local co-management committees. Suggested remedies 
usually involve calls for inclusiveness, accountability and transparency.  
 Summary of WCRPFC Phase II Research 
The Phase II WCRPFC research was launched at workshop in Cape Town in 2000. At the 
workshop, the following three hypotheses were identified for investigation in respect to large-
scale co-management efforts in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Participating in the 
workshop were the Departments of Fisheries in Malawi and Zambia, and the National 
Institute for Development of Small Scale Fisheries in Mozambique. The hypotheses were 
identified through participatory reflections on the Phase I cases studies. This broad 
participation resulted in strong buy-in and commitment to the Phase II field work from the 
participants and motivated extensive interviewing. While lacking in Popperian clarity, the 
hypotheses functioned well as a research guide.   
1. If co-management programmes involve traditional authorities and government departments, that 
are seen to be trustworthy, transparent in their operations, and operating cooperatively and 
equitably, the programmes will be stronger. 
2. Having a greater mixture of stakeholders represented in management committees will lead to 
stronger co-management. 
3. More in-migration in fishing areas will lead to stronger co-management.  
During 2001 and 2002 in each country semi-structured interviews were carried out in local 
languages by people working for the institutions mentioned above. Analysis of the interviews 
was carried out following simple instructions using a word processor to group responses in 
categories based on the concepts named in the hypotheses. In Mozambique (Gervasio and 
Hele, 2002) the research was carried out in two areas where village management committees
1
 
(VMC) were operating along the Atlantic coast. They interviewed a total of 16 fishers, 8 
women’s group leaders, 6 traditional authorities, 10 government officials as well as 8 other 
key informants. In Zambia (Kapasa, 2002) research was also carried out in two areas, both 
with several operating village management committees. One of these was on Lake Mweru and 
the other was on the Luapula River. This work involved a series of group interviews with a 
total of 91 VMC members, 17 women’s club members and 43 fishing association members. 
Fifteen other key informants were also interviewed. In Malawi they decided to focus their 
research on the “negative case” of Lake Malombe to contrast with the heavily studied and 
more successful co-management programme on Lake Chiuta. This also included both 
individual and group interviews with 105 people including 12 gill net fishers, 12 beach seine 
fishers, eight local leaders, two beach seine operators, 30 VMC members, 14 association 
members and 24 fish traders and/or processors, and three fisheries extension agents. 
Summary of Results for Hypothesis 1 
This hypothesis was supported in all three countries. Different elite groups are critical to the 
performance of the programmes but opportunistic behaviour is weakening the co-management 
programmes. Most VMCs confiscate catch and gear when they uncover violations of 
management measures. Some VMCs distribute these funds in the village or support small 
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community development efforts. However, we found a wide perception that government 
officers, TAs and VMC members were benefiting directly from the confiscation of fish and 
gears. This was particularly clear in Malawi, but was found as well in Zambia. 
In Mozambique the TAs were found to be relatively weak in relation to the fishing gear 
owners, but they still play an important cultural role and respondents felt that committees 
whose members include traditional leaders had a greater local influence and that fishing 
regulations were more often respected. Fishing crew are invited to meetings, but do not share 
in the discussions about management because that is under the control of the fishing gear 
owners. Many people are concerned about what goes on between VMC executives and patrol 
team members and this is linked to the participation of wealthier fishers.  
In Zambia the TAs are the dominant local elites, and their participation has both supporters 
and detractors in the community (Kapasa et al., 2005). Critics of TAs in the communities 
accuse them of abusing power to gain fish for themselves and government officers working in 
co-management report that the commitment of the TAs is highly varied. Fisheries fees 
collected by County Councils are also a contentious issue in Zambia (Kapasa et al. this 
volume. The Department of Fisheries also comes in for strong criticism, some of which is 
focussed on their support for co-management. Some respondents felt that the DoF had failed 
to manage the fisheries resources and now was just trying to delegate their responsibilities to 
the public. They are also widely accused of corruption.  
The Malawi research indicated that there is a wide gap between the TAs and the Department 
of Fisheries (DoF) and the active fishers. The VMCs are seen by many fishers to be an arm of 
the DoF cooperating with the wealthier gear owners and the TAs. The TAs and headmen are 
also accused of allowing outsiders to use inappropriate gears in exchange for beach fees paid 
to them personally (Hara et al., 2002). .  
Summary of Results for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 was generally not supported; many respondents indicated that VMCs work 
better when they are primarily made up of fishers. This is highly variable. VMC membership 
is almost always formally selected through village elections, but such elections reflect, and to 
some degree mask, local power relations. The VMC can be one of several, if not many, 
village committees operating in cooperation with government agencies responsible for health, 
education, other forms of conservation, etc. People who are leaders in the VMC are often 
leaders on the others as well and this may contribute to the perception that fewer fishers on 
VMCs makes them less effective.  Some VMCs operate under rules designed to increase the 
gender or occupational diversity of membership, others do not. In Zambia, some respondents 
felt that TAs were actively blocking the participation of other groups and a majority of non-
VMC members interviewed felt that women were the main group excluded. This problem was 
expressed both by a lack of attendance at the meetings and by decision making dynamics 
when they did attend. In many villages decision making is dominated by the village headman 
who often reports to the TA. While issues may be discussed in an open forum or by a council 
of elders, and decisions formalized by a consensus, the headman is often the one making final 
decisions.  
In Malawi and Mozambique the VMC leadership is mainly boat and gear owners. But in 
Malawi respondents said that a common problem with all the VMCs was that they actually 
spent very little time even talking to the common fishers and this was seen as undermining co-
management efforts.  
Summary of Results for Hypothesis 3  
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Hypothesis 3 was generally not supported. It is true that in some cases stronger support for 
co-management comes from fishers using co-management to keep migrants out. An extensive 
debate in Mozambique led to an official upper limit on the number of in-migrants to be 
allowed at each fishing centre during the main migration season as well as the imposition of a 
fee. More commonly, however, the greater disruption and controversy in migration-heavy 
weakens the programme In Malawi migration by fishers using nkacha nets had been a driving 
force behind the initiation of the co-management effort on Lake Chiuta but this has also led to 
strong opposition from TAs and headmen who profit from fees from migrants (Hara et al., 
2002) and businessmen who provide services to migrants.. In Zambia and Malawi these 
disruptions relate to “destructive” gears that are used by migrants, but the how destructiveness 
of any particular gear is often highly contentious and non-migrants may want to adopt these 
gears as well.  
Conclusion 
These findings suggest how complex the problem of elite capture is. African fisheries are in 
almost all cases characterized by economic stratification among fishers, both between owners 
and crew and between those using larger and small types of gear. When trying to scale up 
community based management programmes the backing of traditional authorities and 
government officers is critical. Many examples have been found of the opportunistic use of 
co-management arrangements by all these kinds of elites. This research suggests that the 
questions of transparency and corruption are perhaps the main lever through which the 
problem of elite capture can be and should be addressed.  
One of the remedies suggested in the literature, broad representations on the local 
management committees, was not found to be very effective. While there are general 
problems of exclusion, particularly based on gender, opening up the committees to non-
fishers is a questionable strategy. The most important link between exclusion and 
effectiveness of local management seems to be the way exclusion of the fishers, especially the 
crew and those with smaller fishing enterprises, from real decision making reduces co-
management effectiveness. They are the group who have the local knowledge and on whose 
cooperation conservation is most dependent.  
Finally, this research shows that migratory fishers and their control is a real dilemma. On the 
one hand, in the common case of fluctuating water levels, simply adding more small scale 
fishers does not seem to have a dangerous impact on the resource. Control of fishing times, 
areas, gears and techniques is more important. Cooperation and local support of co-
management programmes, on the other hand, is often based on the exclusion of migrants. But 
this is also divisive within the community because the incoming migrants present an 
opportunity to many community members. Where water levels are steadier, however, there 
may be a much stronger case for limiting entry. In fisheries management in Africa the need is 
not just for institutions that pay attention to the local power and conflicting interests as they 
manage fisheries. The need is for institutions that pay close attention to such relations as they 
create, facilitate and scale up the management institutions themselves. 
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